One of the greatest myths spun around Buharism was that it lacked a sound basis in economic theory. As evidence of this, the regime that succeeded Buhari employed the services of economic “gurus” of “international standard” as the architects of fiscal and monetary policy.
These were IMF and World Bank economists like Dr. Chu Okongwu and Dr Kalu Idika Kalu, as well as Mr SAP himself, Chief Olu Falae (an economist trained at Yale).
At the time Buhari’s Finance Minister, Dr Onaolapo Soleye (who was not a trained economist) was debating with the pro-IMF lobby and explaining why the naira would not be devalued I was teaching economics at the Ahmadu Bello University.
I had no doubt in my mind that the position of Buharism was based on a sound understanding of neo-classical economics and that those who were pushing for devaluation either did not understand their subject or were acting deliberately as agents of international capital in its rampage against all barriers set up by sovereign states to protect the integrity of the domestic economy.
I still believe some of the key economic policy experts of the IBB administration were economic saboteurs who should be tried for treason. When the IMF recently owned up to “mistakes” in its policy prescriptions all patriotic economists saw it for what it was: A hypocritical statement of remorse after attaining set objectives.
Let me explain, briefly, the economic theory underlying Buhari’s refusal to devalue the naira and then show how the policy merely served the interest of global capitalism and its domestic agents. This will be the principal building block of our taxonomy.
In brief, neo-classical theory holds that a country can, under certain conditions, expect to improve its Balance of Payments through devaluation of its currency. The IMF believed that given the pressure on the country’s foreign reserves and its adverse balance of payments situation Nigeria must devalue its currency.
Buharism held otherwise and insisted that the conditions for improving Balance of Payments through devaluation did not exist and that there were alternate and superior approaches to the problem. Let me explain.
The first condition that must exist is that the price of every country’s export is denominated in its currency. If Nigeria’s exports are priced in naira and its imports from the US in dollars then, ceteris paribus, a devaluation of the naira makes imports dearer to Nigerians and makes Nigerian goods cheaper to Americans.
This would then lead to an increase in the quantum of exports to the US and a reduction in the quantum of imports from there per unit of time. But while this is a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient one. For a positive change in the balance of payments the increase in the quantum of exports must be substantial enough to outweigh the revenue lost through a reduction in price.
In other words the quantity exported must increase at a rate faster than the rate of decrease in its price. Similarly imports must fall faster than their price is increasing. Otherwise the nation may be devoting more of its wealth to importing less and receiving less of the wealth of foreigners for exporting more!
In consequence, devaluation by a country whose exports and imports are not price elastic leads to the continued impoverishment of the nation vis a vis its trading partners. The second, and sufficient, condition is therefore that the combined price elasticity of demand for exports and imports must exceed unity.
The argument of Buharism, for which it was castigated by global capital and its domestic agents, was that these conditions did not exist clearly enough for Nigeria to take the gamble. First our major export, oil, was priced in dollars and the volume exported was determined ab initio by the quota set by OPEC, a cartel to which we belonged.
Neither the price nor the volume of our exports would be affected by a devaluation of the naira. As for imports, indeed they would become dearer. However the manufacturing base depended on imported raw materials. Also many essential food items were imported. The demand for imports was therefore inelastic.
We would end up spending more of our national income to import less, in the process fuelling inflation, creating excess capacity and unemployment, wiping out the production base of the real sector and causing hardship to the consumer through the erosion of real disposable incomes.
Given the structural dislocations in income distribution in Nigeria the only groups who would benefit from devaluation were the rich parasites who had enough liquidity to continue with their conspicuous consumption, the large multi-national corporations with an unlimited access to loanable funds and the foreign “investor” who can now purchase our grossly cheapened and undervalued domestic assets.
In one stroke we would wipe out the middle class, destroy indigenous manufacturing, undervalue the national wealth and create inflation and unemployment. This is standard economic theory and it is exactly what happened to Nigeria after it went through the hands of our IMF economists under IBB.
The decision not to devalue set Buharism on a collision course with those who wanted devaluation and would profit from it-namely global capitalism, the so-called “captains of industry” (an acronym for the errand boys of multinational corporations), the nouveaux-riches parasites who had naira and dollars waiting to be spent, the rump elements of feudalism and so on.
Buharism therefore was a crisis in the dominant class, a fracturing of its members into a patriotic, nationalist group and a dependent, parasitic and corrupt one. It was not a struggle between classes but within the same class. A victory for Buharism would be a victory for the more progressive elements of the national bourgeoisie.
Unfortunately the fifth columnists within the military establishment were allied to the backward and retrogressive elements and succeeded in defeating Buharism before it took firm root. But I digress.
Having decided not to devalue or to rush into privatization and liberalization Buharism still faced an economic crisis it must address. There was pressure on foreign reserves, mounting foreign debt and a Balance of Payments crisis. Clearly the demand for foreign exchange outstripped its supply.
The government therefore adopted demand management measures. The basic principle was that we did not really need all that we imported and if we could ensure that our scarce foreign exchange was only allocated to what we really needed we would be able to pay our debts and lay the foundations for economic stability. But this line of action also has its drawbacks.
First, there are political costs to be borne in terms of opposition from those who feel unfairly excluded from the allocation process and who do not share the government’s sense of priorities. Muslims for example cursed Buhari’s government for restricting the number of pilgrims in order to conserve foreign exchange.
Second, in all attempts to manage demand through quotas and quantitative restrictions there is room for abuse because there is always the incentive of a premium to be earned through circumvention of due process. Import licenses become “hot cake” and the black market for foreign exchange highly lucrative.
This policy can only succeed if backed by strong deterrent laws and strict and enforcible exchange rules. Again it is trite micro-economic theory that where price is fixed below equilibrium the market is only cleared through quotas and the potential exists for round tripping as there will be a minority willing and able to offer a very high price for the “artificially scarce” product.
So again we see that the harsh exchange control and economic sabotage laws of Buharism were a necessary and logical fallout of its economic theory.
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