APC TEN-POINT SOLUTION TO END BOKO HARAM

1. DEVELOP AND/OR PUBLISH A COUNTER -TERRORISM STRATEGY:

Presently there is poor coordination between and integration of military means and political and economic objectives. There is currently no publicly known counter-terrorism strategy guiding the response to BH, and the impact of this can be seen in at least three ways: first is the chaos and confusion surrounding the government’s intention to explore a negotiated settlement by dialoguing with BH. One minute the government favours and
seeks to dialogue and grant amnesty to BH, the next minute government rules it out. There are mixed signals from the government. Second is the lack of use and coordination of military, political and economic means, yet successful counter-insurgency requires close coordination of military, political and economic means and objectives.

2. BUILD A NEW INTELLIGENCE GATHERING INFRASTRUCTURE: 

In 2012, Nigeria announced plans for a new intelligence fusion centre to coordinate, improve and integrate intelligence gathering and sharing across agencies. We need to obtain more timely and actionable intelligence from local sources in the areas affected by Boko Haram. We would also establish an office of the Special Anti-Terrorism Coordinator.

3. IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE: 

The solution to preventing, limiting and responding better to BH attacks does not lie in deploying more troops but in improving intelligence and increasing force enablers. The fight against BH will be enhanced if government focuses on these two elements.

4. IMPROVE CONTINGENCY PLANNING:  

Most major militaries around the world have plans for the major challenges they are likely to face. We need to begin to create plans and conduct training exercises that reflect the challenges we will face. In this manner. Our security apparatus will be better prepared if and when a situation arises.

5. PURSUE AND ALIGN MILITARY WITH POLITICAL (NEGOTIATED) SOLUTIONS: 

Boko Haram is unlikely to be defeated militarily. Most insurgencies are ended through some form of negotiation. Government must develop a strategy along the lines of the policy followed by President Yar’Adua (over the MEND insurgency in the Niger Delta) at least to the extent that we use employment and other rehabilitative incentives to separate the rank and file from Boko Haram’s leadership.

6. DE-RADICALIZATION STRATEGY: 

The Northern region is in urgent need of a counter-radicalization program to prevent many more young people (illiterate and unemployed) from being radicalized. Such strategies would require initiatives to counter violent extremist ideology and create positive incentives against radicalization (beyond the current focus on punitive measures – arrest, detention and killing), give voice and representation to young people in the region, etc.

7. REGIONALIZE (ECOWAS AND AU) RESPONSE: 

The government to solicit the operational involvement and assistance of ECOWAS and AU, including deploying multinational security operations across the Sahel to track and hunt down Boko Haram operational chain. It is clear that Boko Haram is no longer a ‘Nigeria-only’ problem, but now a regional security menace that requires regional responses.

8. EFFECTIVE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION: 

The government needs to reform the way information is released and managed on Boko Haram. This goes beyond official information management and government agencies to include working with print, electronic and online media organizations, and local (grassroots) information channels.

9. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR NORTHERN NIGERIA:

The proposed recovery fund for the North East is grossly inadequate window dressing. A real and massive effort is needed. Clearly more financial resources are needed. Economic revival goes beyond providing substantial funds – it has to be guided by clear objectives, roles of public and private sectors and civil society groups, and must include social (education, health, religion, culture and traditional institutions), environmental, and political aspects, in addition to economic issues.

10. INVOLVE CIVILIAN PEACE BUILDING ORGANIZATIONS (MILITARY AND POLICE CANNOT BUILD PEACE): 

Uniformed personnel are never peace builders. The government needs to urgently involve local and international peace building organizations, including NGOs, CSOs, etc. to design peace building initiatives for the NE.