In the last couple of weeks, the Nigerian Army has faced a barrage of criticisms from commentators and analysts over perceived poor handling of the ongoing Counter –Insurgency Operations in the North East. These criticisms have been based to a large extent on Boko Haram propaganda, poor logic and emotion. Consequently, they have failed to add value to the on-going efforts to deal with the Boko Haram crisis. Rather than help, the cancerous and sensational criticisms have heightened fear among the public, degraded public perception of the Nigerian Army and dampened the fighting spirit of troops. In the light of this unfortunate development, it has become imperative to look critically at some of the issues, particularly, the media frenzy about hunters and the recapture of Mubi.
Recently, the reading public was inundated with reports about how hunters have become more successful than the military in dealing with the Boko Haram problem. To underscore this point, the media reported that Adamawa State Government has concluded arrangement to employ more hunters. In this era of unusual occurrence, who knows, a bill may be sent to the 8th National Assembly for hunters to be granted Presidential Commission into the Armed Forces of Nigeria. But, is the hysteria about Adamawa hunters and their alleged role in the ongoing counter – insurgency operations in Mubi real? or is it a creation of fifth Columnists who are bent on undermining the Armed Forces of Nigeria and denying it any credit?
Let us examine this so-called re-capture of Mubi by hunters and see what merit or otherwise it may have. We all come from villages, so we should know that hunting tools include; bows and arrows, spears, traps, hunting dogs, machetes as well as cock and shoot ‘dane’ guns. I will pay a little more attention to the ‘dane’ gun, because of all the hunters tools mentioned, only the ‘dane’ gun can constitute a meaningful threat to life in a military sense, if the target is within 30 metres. Dane guns are neither automatic nor semi automatic, they do not fire any projectile. Rather, ‘dane’ guns fire pellets. Besides, ‘dane’ guns are effective only when used in very close quarter engagements. Consequently, in military terms, hunters armed with a weapon having the characteristics listed above, do not constitute any reckonable fighting force.
On the other hand, Boko Haram insurgents purportedly driven away by hunters have benefited significantly from black market arms, as well as the pilferage and looting of Libyan Armed Forces arsenal following a failed revolution. Arising from this, Boko Haram insurgents are armed with light infantry weapons such as Rocket Propelled Grenade launchers and bombs, General Purpose Machine Guns, AK 47 Rifles, Anti Aircraft guns and assorted Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). To put the purported hunters/Boko Haram clash in Mubi into perspective, I will examine the characteristics of at least 3 weapons in Boko Haram’s inventory. The AK 47 rifle is the most versatile infantry weapon in its category. It is a magazine-fed weapon with a capacity of 30 rounds and is lethal up to 300 metres. The Anti Aircraft gun is another weapon widely used by the insurgents. It is belt-fed, fires up to 400 rounds per minute and can kill a target at up to and beyond 3,000 metres. Boko Haram insurgents are known to fire this weapon mounted on Buffalo or Hilux pickup trucks in anti-personnel role. The Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG 7) is a close quarter weapon with enormous shock effect and devastating impact. Additionally, most Boko Haram insurgents are non-Nigerians from neighbouring countries and have gained extensive combat experience from decades of civil wars in their own countries and the Sahel region.
Looking at the asymmetry in capacity, equipment and motivation between the so-called hunters and Boko Haram insurgents, it is obvious that the widely reported clashes between hunters and Boko Haram insurgents and the eventual dislodgement of the later from Mubi and environs could not have taken place, as that would have amounted to suicide on the part of the hunters. Besides, human beings naturally celebrate achievement and cherish the limelight that comes with it, so how come no hunter has been identified or interviewed to tell the world how the feat of chasing away phenomenally superior Boko Haram insurgents was achieved? The staggering disparity in strength (both in number and equipment) between the hunters and Boko Haram casts doubts on the widely reported clashes.
The reality is that dealing with threats constituted by a cross-border extremist terrorist organisation with a complex international financing, recruitment and logistics network is a huge challenge. This situation becomes even more daunting when a regional framework for counter terrorism is just being developed. Those who have followed trends in terrorism and its management should know that this has been the challenge even for the most advanced countries. Therefore, in managing this conflict in Nigeria, it is not out of place for the Armed Forces of Nigeria to appropriate resources that could assist in finding solutions to the problem. Consequently, if local hunters or other local assets provide human intelligence, point to tracks and hideouts of insurgents, it is a welcome development. I believe this has been the scope of the involvement of hunters and other non – military elements in the counter - insurgency. All over the world, counter – insurgency operatives adapt local assets into their Operational Art to achieve the desired end state. The French did so in Algeria in the 1950s, the British did same in Malaya and Northern Ireland. Similarly, the Americans are doing same in the Middle East and Central Asia. In West Africa, we are already familiar with the Karmajos in Sierra Leone. However, the involvement of local assets in counter – insurgency operations in these countries was never interpreted to mean the capitulation of the national army. So, why is the situation different in Nigeria?
Without doubt, managing an insurgency of the size of Boko Haram is an enormous challenge. The military does have its own challenges. In this regard, the Nigerian Army is dealing firmly with cases of gross indiscipline, such as aiding the enemy, mutiny, cowardice and desertion. Sections 45, 52, and 60 respectively, of the Army Forces Act CAP A20 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2014 deal with these infractions. Also, the issue of human right abuses which has been blown out of proportion is also receiving prompt attention. Recently, The Nigerian Army Corps of Military Police, in conjunction with Defence Institute of International Legal Studies of the United States organized a workshop on “Detainee Operations”. The training of troops on the expectation of the Geneva Conventions regarding the Laws of Armed Conflicts has always been part of the Nigerian Army training curricular for both officers and soldiers in all Nigerian Army Training Institutions. Previous collaborations have been with the Nigerian delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross. It must be noted that Nigerian Army and Boko Haram do not share the same responsibility in the conduct of operations. While troops must painstakingly identify targets before engagement, insurgents kill at random, without any obligation under subsisting international conventions regulating the conduct of armed conflict.
Perhaps, the greater challenge which the Nigerian Army faces in the ongoing counter – insurgency operations in the North East, is that a lot of people do not seem to reckon with the fact that it takes more than weapons to end terrorism and insurgency. There is no quick fix to terrorism. The intractability of Boko Haram is in part due to its complex and cellular organizational structure. This also explains why its defeat will not be in the conventional sense. Therefore, the crisis the nation faces requires the collaboration and participation of everyone to deal with various dimensions and manifestation of the crisis. The Nigerian Army has never shied away from calling for this collaboration and support from the public. The apprehension over the so called seizure of Nigerian territories by insurgents is understandable. However, researchers and followers of insurgency and counter – insurgency icons like Mao Tse Tung and David Galula would know that Boko Haram lacks the wherewithal to hold any area it claims to have seized, let alone win the war. The so called seizure of territories is at best symbolic.
Arising from developments in terror enclaves across the world, particularly in Iraq, Syria and North Africa, it is obvious that the challenge of violent extremism and terrorism is existential. In other words, it is a threat to our development, ways of life, survival and future of our children. Therefore, no one, I repeat no one should be under the illusion that terrorists and violent extremists could eventually become associates and friends. Consequently, comments and analyses in the media which to tend to glorify aberrant, criminal and violent behaviours are completely misplaced. To this end, the Nigerian Army will continue to conduct full spectrum counter-terrorism and counter – insurgency operations across its battle space. With the correct attitude of every Nigerian towards the common enemy, very soon Boko Haram terrorists and their collaborators will not have anywhere to hide in Nigeria. Therefore, to achieve this national defence and security objectives, the Nigerian Army needs partnership and collaboration not subversion.
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