BUHARI: MYTH OR MYSTERY

By Opeyemi Agbaje

I have never been a fan of Muhammadu Buhari. When he took power in December 1983 as military head of state, I was already a third-year law student at Ife. He headed a brutal and unthinking dictatorship, one that jailed journalists, abolished civil liberties and declared it wasn’t interested in democracy – the only military government that never announced a transition to civil rule programme! His regime was headed for the only time in Nigeria’s history by two Northerners, indeed two Fulanis, according to some reports about Idiagbon’s ancestry. He rushed to exonerate ex-President Shagari from wrongdoing while appearing determined to pin all blame on his deputy, Alex Ekwueme, and the opposition parties. Curiously, the pattern of trials and convictions by his military tribunals suggested that Second Republic corruption was led by the opposition parties – in particular, the UPN and NPP – rather than the ruling NPN.

He sought to humiliate Awolowo, sending soldiers to ransack his residence. Yet, his “War Against Indiscipline” had its exceptions – his ADC allegedly helping to clear an Emir’s 53 suitcases through the airports during a currency exchange programme. He ran a government of no more than four or five people – his deputy Idiagbon; his National Security Organisation head, Ambassador Rafindadi; his minister of Internal Affairs, Mohammed Magoro; and himself – to the exclusion of his colleagues in the Supreme Military Council and everyone else. He was easily overthrown, having thoroughly isolated himself from every power centre. In a sense, his government might be seen as precursor to the murderous Abacha regime: seeking absolute power, promulgating retroactive laws, terrorising and proscribing civil society organisations and professional groups.

Before becoming military dictator, Buhari had served serially as military governor and minister of Petroleum under Murtala/Obasanjo, and GOC in Jos from where he and others orchestrated the 1983 toppling of democracy. The myth of outsider to the Nigerian ruling class is strange, given his CV. How could someone who occupied those positions and ran our oil sector under the military be excluded from Nigeria’s problems? As head of state, Buhari did not make any dent in Nigerian corruption. Indeed, the counter-trade scam which happened under his watch was no different, in scope and scale, from the petroleum subsidy and other corruption scandals that have since plagued Nigeria. And what about the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) which Buhari led under Abacha? Anyone who was an adult during Abacha’s reign can testify that PTF was the biggest source of patronage and corruption in the Nigerian economy in its time! One is also entitled to wonder whether Buhari cared about human rights abuses under Abacha, such as the killing of Kudirat Abiola, shooting of Alex Ibru and Abraham Adesanya, or the several concocted coup plots of that era?

I may be willing to concede, in the absence of contrary information, that Buhari may not be personally corrupt, but corruption thrived below and around him due probably to his seeming inclination to abdicate the powers of offices he occupied to someone, usually a subordinate. Most people attribute the running of the “Buhari/Idiagbon” regime to Idiagbon; it is believed that subordinates (Salahijo/Tayo Akpata, etc) managed the PTF; even his Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) is managed by Sule Hamma and Buba Galadinma, and they may have perpetrated activities in Buhari’s name which he was unaware of and which have destabilised that party. How will such a “leader” fight corruption? That trait encourages politicians to seek to be his deputy, hoping they would be beneficiaries of the “Buhari Power Abdication Syndrome”. But there could, especially in a presidential system, be an alternative model – the Abacha/Diya model – in which a deputy ends up in prison rather than power! An executive president could, for instance, simply appoint Hamma as SGF and Galadinma as Chief of Staff, while marginalising any vice president. Ask Diya about Aminu Saleh, Auwalu Yadudu and Hamza al-Mustapha; or ask Jonathan about his powers under Yar’Adua! There could be a third model, of course – the Goodluck model.

Buhari’s other shortcoming, which feeds the abdication syndrome, is his seeming lack of interest and competence in policy and administration. This could be said to have been demonstrated on national television during the pre-election presidential debates as he displayed stunning lack of depth on virtually all aspects of policy. His other limitation has consistently been displayed since return to democracy in 1999 – parochialism. While aspiring to power in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious nation where political stability and national integration cannot yet be taken for granted, his public statements have included advocacy for implementation of Sharia all over Nigeria; advising Muslims not to vote for persons who won’t protect their faith; accusing an Oyo State governor in the aftermath of a Fulani herdsmen and indigenous farmers dispute that “your people are killing my people”, a claim that turned out to be unfounded and perhaps the reverse; alleged incitement to violence before the 2011 general elections and petulance thereafter; and recent but not surprising threat of bloodshed and “dogs and baboons” over the 2015 elections which is three years away!

It is a mystery that Buhari gets consideration in the context of national leadership. He clearly lacks the temperament required for the office and his supporters might be well-advised to seek alternatives.